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STUDENT ARTICLES
A La Carte v. Channel Bundling: The
Debate Over Video Programming
Distribution
By Christopher T. Buckley*
I. Introduction
Cable rates have risen significantly since deregulation of the
cable industry in 1996.1 Cable companies point to increases in
quality and in the number of channels offered as an explanation for
the increase in rates and claim that there has actually been a reduction
in the quality-adjusted price of cable service.2 Consumer groups
counter that this approach is flawed because it values all the new
channels the same, ignoring the fact that subscribers are not watching
all the added channels.3 According to a Nielsen Media Research
* Christopher T. Buckley, J.D. candidate, May 2009, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law, Bachelor of Arts in Communications, Loyola University
Chicago.
1 See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, MB DOCKET No. 03-172,
TENTH ANNUAL REPORT: IN THE MATTER OF ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS
OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING)
10, at 7 (Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter TENTH ANNUAL REPORT] ("According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, between year-end 1993 and the end of June 2003, the
Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), which measures general price changes, increased
approximately 25.5%, while cable prices, also measured as a subcategory of the
CPI, rose approximately 53.1%").
2 Stephen S. Wildman, Assessing Quality-Adjusted Changes in the Real Price
of Basic Cable Service 1-2 (Sep. 2003), http://i.ncta.com/nctacom/
PDFs/wildmanstudy.pdf; Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Douglas A. Trueheart, Rising
Cable TV Rates: Are Programming Costs The Villain? 16-17 (Oct. 2003),
http://www.capanalysis.com/docs/risingcableratesoct_2004.pdf.
3 Consumer Federation of America, The Continuing Abuse of Market Power
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report, the average home received 104.2 channels in 2006, but only
tuned in to 15.7 channels for at least 10 minutes per week.4 One
proposed solution to exorbitant cable bills is to allow cable
subscribers to eliminate the 90 channels they do not watch by
adopting an A la carte system, which would allow customers to pick,
and pay for, only the channels they want.
In many ways consumer choice has increased in recent years.
A few years ago, consumers had no choice in telephone companies-
they had to go to Ma Bell. Now they have a choice of phone
companies for home phone service, not to mention countless cell
phone companies. Not too long ago, if consumers wanted a song
they had to go to the store and buy the entire album. Now they can
download a single song from iTunes. In this environment, it is only
natural that consumers expect to be able to pick and choose which
cable channels they pay for and receive. Instead, under the current
large tier system, multichannel video programming distributors
("MVPDs"). control the programming that subscribers receive.
Although consumer choice may seem to be on the rise, many
goods and services are still sold in packages, without the option to
purchase individual parts d la carte. If a reader wants only the sports
section, she usually has to buy the whole newspaper. If a prospective
law school student wants in-class instruction from a test-prep
company only for the logic games portion of the LSAT, she usually
must enroll in a course that covers the entire test. And if a student
wants to take a property course at a law school, she usually must pay
for a minimum number of credit hours. At the same time, even when
a consumer can choose what parts she wants, she may have to pay for
By the Cable Industry: Rising Prices, Denial of Consumer Choice, and
Discriminatory Access to Content 2 (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter Continuing Abuse of
Market Power] (quoting TENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, 139, at 83-84),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/mpcableindustry.pdf
4 Nielsen Media Research, Average U.S. Home Now Receives A Record 104.2
TV Channels, According to Nielsen (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.nielsen
media.com/nc/portal/site/Public/menuitem.55dc65b4a7d5adff3f6593614 7aO62aO/?
vgnextoid=48839bc66a96111 0VgnVCM 100000acOa26OaRCRD.
As the number of channels available to a household increased, so did the
number of channels tuned, although the percentage of available channels actually
viewed decreased. In 2006, the average household tuned to 15.7 (or 15.1%) of the
104.2 channels available. This compares to 2000, when the average home viewed
22.1% of the available channels (13.6 channels viewed out of 61.4 available
channels).
5 The term "MVPD" encompasses all cable operators or satellite TV operators
that sell multiple channels of video programming.
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the ones she does not want-imagine a McDonald's customer
requesting a discount because she wants a Big Mac without lettuce,
pickles, or onions. But in all these situations the consumer does have
options-she can take her business elsewhere.
Cable companies, on the other hand, face very little
6competition. Even if consumers have a choice of which television
channels they get, an individual channel is a "package" itself.7 Each
channel broadcasts a group of programs and consumers do not
usually get to choose which specific programs they get. So even
under an A la carte system, consumers who want to watch one
program on a cable channel will usually have to subscribe to the
whole channel. 8 Because even an 4 la carte channel choice will
present the consumer with options between packages of programming
to some extent, the question becomes which packaging model is best
for the consumer.
Where should the line be drawn? Should consumers only pay
for the part of the newspaper or text book they read, program they
watch, or time of day they watch? The current bundling system,
where the average household gets over 100 channels and actually
watches less than 16 of them, may not be the best place to draw the
line from the consumer's perspective. A pure A la carte system, 10
6 See Andrew Zimbalist, Economic Perspectives on Market Power in the
Telecasting of US Team Sports, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT AND THE MEDIA 160,
164-65 (Claude Jeanrenaud & Stefan Kdsenne ed., 2006) ("Of the 10,157 cable
systems in the United States, fewer than 100 of them have competition from
another system (either another cable company or a telephone company delivering
cable signals) in their area."); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF. GAO-04-8, ISSUES RELATED
TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY, at
9 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d048.pdf (finding that
cable subscribers in only 2% of markets have "the opportunity to choose between
two or more wire-based video operators." But, "where competition is present,
cable rates are significantly lower.").
7 Even television programs themselves could be considered a package of
segments, because they could be logically broken up into smaller parts.
8 Increasingly consumers have options other than purchasing a channel if they
want to watch a particular program. For example, many popular TV shows are
available for purchase on DVD or are available for download on the Internet-
some downloads are free, others can be purchased.
9 This pricing method, where customers can only purchase a fixed-price
bundle, is referred to as "pure bundling." See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 324 (4th ed. 2005).
1o This pricing method, where customers can order each item separately, is
referred to as "individual pricing." Id.
2008]
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where consumers have a channel-by-channel selection but can only
purchase channels individually, also may not give consumers the best
choice of channels." There are, however, options other than the two
extremes. 12 But finding a workable compromise, either through the
application of existing antitrust law or the creation of new legislation,
will be difficult without definitive data on the potential impact of a
change in the cable and satellite distribution system.
II. The Basic Positions of the Two Sides in the Current
A La Carte Debate
The A la carte debate has brought together a wide range of
groups on both sides of the issue. Those who oppose the A la carte
system include representatives from the NAACP and the Rainbow
Push Coalition, along with the CATO Institute; even Jerry Falwell
and Pat Robertson join with Planned Parenthood in opposition to an A
la carte system.' 3  Groups such as Consumers Union, Consumer
Federation of America, Parents Television Council, and Concerned
Women for America support A la carte. 14
Interestingly, this issue has divided groups that, at first glance,
seem like logical allies. For example, Black Entertainment
Television ("BET") opposes A la carte while the Black Education
Network ("BEN") and the Urban Broadcasting Company ("UBC")
support it, and Christian Television Network suports A la carte while
the Christian Broadcasting Network opposes it. This split seems to
11 See MEDIA BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FURTHER
REPORT ON THE PACKAGING AND SALE OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING SERVICES TO THE
PUBLIC n.7 at 6 (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-263740A1 .pdf [hereinafter FURTHER REPORT].
12 The simplest and most obvious alternative is "mixed bundling," where
customers can chose between a fixed-price bundle and A la carte. See CARLTON &
PERLOFF, supra note 9.
13 For an extensive list of people and organizations who have written letters to
Congress and the FCC opposing d la carte pricing, see National Cable &
Telecommunications Association, Government Mandated A La Carte: Making You
Pay More For Less, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.ncta.com/PublicationType/
TalkingPoint/ALaCartelsMoreForLess.aspx.
14 See Letter to the House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2004), http://
www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/042804_HouseLTRCblChoice.pdf.
15 National Cable and Telecommunications Association, supra note 13. For a
list of A la carte supporters, see Consumers Union, Channel Choice: Diverse Voices
for Cable Choice, http://www.hearnsnow.org/cablesatellite/5/diversevoices
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be based largely on the way the current system affects the distribution
of the networks. BET is a division of Viacom.16 and is accordingly
distributed on most cable and satellite systems. 17 BEN and UBC, on
the other hand, are not part of a larger media group and have
encountered great difficulty getting distribution on cable systems.
18
The debate over whether an A la carte system is the best option for
consumers is not as clear cut as one would think.
III. The Pro-A La Carte Position
Proponents of an d la carte system argue that the current
bundling system has caused soaring cable bills and forces consumers
to pay for programming they do not want. They advocate a system
where consumers have greater control over the type of content they
are paying for and the price they are paying. The consumer groups'
perspective is grounded on the idea of a marketplace influenced by
consumer preferences, which they believe would lead to greater
competition, consumer sovereignty, and consumer freedom.' 9 They
believe there should be "marketplace implications for programmers
when subscribers don't want a channel, whether it is because they
find the content to be inappropriate or because they simply aren't
interested.",20  The family-oriented perspective of FCC Chairman
Kevin Martin and groups such as the Parents Television Council is
grounded on the idea that customers should not have to pay for
programming they find offensive. They believe the current system
forces parents "to buy the channels they do not want their families to
forcablechoice/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
16 BET Networks Corporate Fact Sheet, http://bet.mediaroom.com/
index.php?s=45 (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
17 See About Viacom, http://www.viacom.com/aboutviacom/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) (BET Networks is delivered to "more than
88 million households").
18 See Consumers Union, supra note 15.
19 See Gene Kimmelman & Dr. Mark Cooper, Reply Comments of Consumers
Union and The Consumer Federation of America, In the Matter of Comment
Requested on a La Carte and Themed Tier Programming and Pricing Options for
Programming Distribution on Cable Television And Direct Broadcast Satellite
Systems, 32-33 (Aug. 13, 2004), http://www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/
081304_FCCReplyCMTSCbl.pdf.
20 Kevin Martin, Newton N. Minow, & Dan Lipinski, Op-Ed., For kids' sake,
TV must go a la carte: A la carte pricing would give cable subscribers meaningful
programming choices, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 20, 2007.
2008] 417
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view in order to obtain the family-friendly channels they desire.'
In other words, parents who want Nickelodeon should not be forced
to subscribe to MTV.
In a July 2007 op-ed piece published in the Chicago Tribune,
current FCC chairman Kevin Martin, former FCC Chairman Newton
Minow, and United States Representative Dan Lipinski (D-Ill.) argue
that consumers "deserve greater control over content and their cable
bills."22 The authors propose a variety of options to implement A la
carte pricing. One would allow consumers "to 'opt out' of unwanted
channels and not be charged for their cost." 23 Another option would
allow subscribers "to 'opt in' to particular cable networks in the same
way that premium channels like HBO are offered today.",24 A third
alternative would allow customers "to pick a smaller package of
channels, choosing from offers of '10 packs' and '20 packs' of
channels."
' 25
A la carte is also a popular idea among cable subscribers. A
May 2004 Consumers Union survey shows that two-thirds of cable
TV subscribers want to choose the channels they get, and pay only
for those channels. 26  Two-thirds also think that picking fewer
channels should lower their cable bill. 27 Fifty-nine percent would
pick fewer channels than they get in their current package. 28 Only
twenty-nine percent, however, would choose fewer channels even if
the bill did not decline proportionately. 29  So the majority of
consumers seem to want A la carte only if it will lower their monthly
cable bill.
21 Open Forum on Decency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp. (Nov. 29, 2005) (statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-262484A 1.doc [hereinafter Statement of Kevin Martin].
22 See Martin, Minow, & Lipinski, supra note 20.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Consumers Union Cable TV Issues Survey (May 25, 2004),
http://www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/052504CUCableChoicePoll.pdf.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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IV. The Anti- A La Carte Position
Opponents of i la carte, however, warn that consumers who
yearn for a system that allows them to pick channels from a menu,
and pay only for those channels that they want, should be careful
what they wish for.30 Opponents argue that an Ai la carte system
would be a consumer disaster-resulting in higher prices and
decreased programming diversity. 31 Consumers who choose as few
as a dozen channels would end up with higher bills than they
32
currently pay for hundreds of channels under the current system. In
addition, consumer choice would decline as diversity of
programming would decrease due to the disappearance of smaller
cable channels because of a lack of subscribers. As many smaller
cable networks only exist because of the support that more popular
networks provide through bundling, i la carte opponents contend
bundles "are not anticonsumer but proconsumer."
34
In a November 2007 New York Times article, borrowing
from a research note by Craig Moffett which used ESPN and BET as
examples, columnist Joe Nocera illustrates how A la carte would drive
the price of individual channels up so high that even consumers who
chose only a handful of channels would pay more for cable. 35 If you
suppose that, under an i la carte system, twenty-five percent of cable
customers would subscribe to ESPN 36-which currently charges $3
per subscriber per month (the highest amount of any basic cable
network)-the network would have to increase the per-subscriber
charge by 400 percent, to $12 a month to maintain its current
revenue.3 1 And ESPN is one of the most popular cable networks;
38
30 Joe Nocera, Bland Menu If Cable Goes A la Carte, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2007, at C I [hereinafter Bland Menu].
31 id.
32 Id.
33 id.
34 Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot Release 3.15, Nov. 2007,
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2007/ps3.15cablecon.pdf
35 Bland Menu, supra note 30.
36 The 25% estimate used in this example is in line with a recent study by
Deutsche Bank which found that 78% of survey respondents said that they would
not pay $2 per month for ESPN if they were given a choice. See Continuing Abuse
of Market Power, supra note 3, at 22.
37 Bland Menu, supra note 30.
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less popular networks would have to raise fees even higher to
survive. If you, unrealistically, suppose every African-American
family in America would subscribe to BET, the network would have
to raise its fees by 588 percent.39 If only half subscribed, "still a
wildly optimistic scenario," the network would have to raise its fees
by 1,200 percent. 40 With such high per-channel fees consumers
would get fewer channels while paying as much, or even more, for
monthly cable bills.
Opponents of A la carte also argue that groups that see i la
carte as a good way to clean up TV will be unhappy with the result of
such regulation. MTV, F/X, Comedy Central, Spike and other
channels that broadcast content that family-oriented groups may find
objectionable "subsidize the small religious and family stations. 4 1
Without this support some "family-friendly" networks may
disappear, while the 4opular channels with "objectionable" content
would likely survive.
V. The FCC's Reports on Video Program Packaging
The FCC has released two unofficial reports on A la carte
pricing of cable channels, the Report on the Packaging and Sale of
Video Programming Services to the Public ("First Report"), and the
Further Report On the Packaging and Sale of Video Programming
Services To the Public ("Further Report"). The reports, however,
appear to reach contradictory conclusions. Both reports are based on
an independent study performed by Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. ("Booz
Allen Study") 43 for the National Cable and Telecommunications
38 According to its website, ESPN is currently in more than 96 million
households, cable operators consider "ESPN the most important network in their
cable system," and ESPN's flagship show, SportsCenter, is watched by "[a]s many
as 93.7 million people a month." ESPN Corporate Information,
http://www.espnmediazone.com/corpinfo/corpfact_sheet.html (last visited Apr.
17, 2008).
39 Bland Menu, supra note 30.
40 Id.
41 Derek Hunter, Liberals and Conservatives Catch the Regulatory Bug, TCS
DAILY, Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.tcsdaily.com/printArticle.aspx?ID=040407B.
42 Adam Thierer, Moral and Philosophical Aspects of the Debate over A La
Carte Regulation, Progress Snapshot Release 1.23, at 3, Dec. 2005,
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/psl .23alacarte.pdf.
43 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., The a la Carte Paradox: Higher Consumer Costs
420 [Vol. 20:4
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Association ("NCTA")." Given a lack of comprehensive empirical
data, Booz Allen was unable to avoid employing an indirect approach
and relying "on a number of potentially challengeable assumptions
about how households, cable and satellite operators, and program
networks would behave. 45
The First Report, released in 2004 in response to
Congressional requests, concludes that requiring MVPDs to provide
programming on an d la carte basis would likely increase the monthly
bills of the average subscriber and may decrease the diversity of
available programming. 46  When Kevin Martin took over as FCC
chairman, he "had many concerns with this report, including the logic
and some of the assumptions used," and he "asked the Media Bureau
as well as [the FCC's] Chief Economist to take a more thorough look
at the issue."' 47 This resulted in the Further Report, which "concludes
that the earlier report relied on problematic assumptions and
presented incorrect and incomplete analysis,"48 and that "a la carte
could be in consumers' best interests."
4 9
VI. The FCC's First Report
The First Report "concludes that a la carte regulation will
likely increase operational expenses for MVPDs in three main areas:
(1) equipment and infrastructure; 50 (2) customer service operations;
and Reduced Programming Diversity (Jul. 2004), http://www.ncta.com/
PublicationType/ExpertStudy/572.aspx.
44 Charles B. Goldfarb, The FCC's "a la Carte" Reports (Mar. 30, 2006),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33338_20060330.pdf [hereinafter
The FCC's "a la Carte" Reports].
41 Id. at 2.
46 MEDIA BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE
PACKAGING AND SALE OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC 6-7
(Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch
/DOC-254432Al.pdf [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
47 Statement of Kevin Martin, supra note 21.
48 Id.
49 FURTHER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
50 "Set-top box expenses would account for 71% to 80% of the increased costs
of cable operators." First Report, supra note 46, at 95. But, the cable industry's
longstanding argument-that customers don't want, and shouldn't have to pay for,
set top boxes-is rapidly loosing much of its significance, as cable companies are
currently moving to a set top box requirement. For example, in Chicago, RCN will
2008]
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and (3) billing and back office support." 51 These "cost increases
would be most detrimental to smaller cable operators," and may thus
"have an adverse impact on competition as smaller cable operators
would have a difficult time competing with the industry's primary
competitors."52 An d la carte system may also decrease advertising
revenues while increasing marketing expenses, as networks would
then have to "induce consumers to affirmatively select the
network., 53  As program networks fail-"most likely.. .networks
serving small niche interests, such as religious programming,
programming aimed at minority interests, arts programming and
independently owned networks"-the diversity of programming
available to consumers would decrease. 54  The First Report also
estimates that consumers that purchase nine or more channels "would
likely face an increase in their monthly bills. 55  The average
household "would likely face an increase in their monthly bill... of
between 14% and 30%.,,56
The First Report also finds that market competition and
technological advances may deliver the competition, choice, and
control that d la carte advocates desire. 57 The entry of new over-the-
air broadcasters and telephone companies into the MVPD market
may bring more competition, and result in new programming
models. 58  Technological advances, such as "video-on-demand
("VOD") and digital video recorders ("DVRs")," are increasing
consumer control. 59  Delivery of video over the internet has the
soon require each television to have a cable box, see Frequently Asked Questions
for RCN Digital Cable TV, http://www.rcn.com/digital/faqs.php (last visited Apr.
16, 2008), and Comcast currently requires a cable box or cable card for most
services, Telephone Interview with Comcast Employee, 1-800-COMCAST (April
18, 2008).
51 FIRST REPORT, supra note 46, at 6.
52 id.
53 id.
54 Id.
55 id.
56 FIRST REPORT, supra note 46, at 6.
57Id. at7.
58 Id.
59 id.
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potential to lower distribution costs and "make a la carte a reality." 60
In addition, blocking technology has the potential to "ensure that the
public can block any unwanted programming from entering their
homes." 6
1
The First Report also briefly addresses concerns about the
62wholesale acquisition of programming by MVPDs. The current
wholesale system involves tying arrangements. MVPDs acquiring
rights to a popular network are sometimes contractually obligated to
purchase a less attractive network.63 The Report concludes "that if
this practice is anti-competitive and it is causing consumer harm
(both of which are currently far from clear and would benefit from
further study), the antitrust authorities are best positioned to remedy
the situation.,
64
VII. The FCC's Further Report
On the other hand, the Further Report concludes that "many
consumers could be better off under an a la carte model. ' '"
Specifically, the Report criticizes the First Report's reliance on the
Booz Allen Study, saying: the Study, conducted on behalf of an
industry association, was based on unreasonable and unsupported
assumptions, and contained errors. 66 The Further Report concludes
that once a mistake in the Booz Allen Study's calculations-
including the broadcast basic networks in the cost per channel
calculation-is corrected, "consumers could receive as many as 20
channels without seeing an increase in their monthly bills." 67
Accordingly, a consumer who purchased eleven cable channels
would see "a change in his bill ranging from a 13% decrease to a 4%
increase, with a decrease in 3 out of 4 cases," instead of the 14% to
30% bill increase that the First Report predicted.68
60 Id.
61 FIRST REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.
62 Id. at 66.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 7.
65 FURTHER REPORT, supra note 11, at 5.
66 Id. at 6-7.
67 1d. at 10-11.
68 Id. at 9.
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The Further Report also questions the Booz Allen Study's
assumption that "a shift to a la carte would cause consumers to watch
more than 2 hours less television per day," saying: "[t]here is little
reason to believe that, given enhanced choice, consumers would
watch... less than they do today.' 69 Without a drop in viewership,
"significant decreases in advertising revenues" are unlikely, and
advertising rates may actually increase for many popular networks. 
70
So consumers who subscribe to only the most popular channels may
see substantial savings in their bills from switching to A la carte.
7 1
The Further Report also concludes that current bundling
practices may keep some potential customers and networks from
entering the market. The high price of bundled service may deter
some potential customers from subscribing to service,72 while an & la
carte system would allow customers to control the amount of their
monthly cable bill.73 And new networks may find it easier to enter
the market because advertisers and MVPDs would be better able to
assess the value of smaller networks, which "could demonstrate their
popularity with the public through a la carte sales."
74
The Further Report states that the First Report ignores
potential consumer benefits and overstates the implementation costs
of d la carte. The Further Report proposes that implementation costs
could be greatly reduced "if a la carte were offered only for digital
channels. '  In addition, an & la carte system could provide "diverse
programming responsive to consumer demand," where large bundles
may prevent consumers "from getting the programming they want."
76
The Further Report then goes on to detail some options that
would provide increased consumer choice in programming while
allowing MVPDs to continue to offer their current pre-established
bundles if the bundles best meet the individual subscriber's needs.
77
One option is "mixed bundling," which would allow consumers to
69 Id. at 23.
70 FURTHER REPORT, supra note 11, at 24-25.
71 Id. at 5.
72 id.
73 Id.
74 Id at 27.
75 FURTHER REPORT, supra note 11, at 28-30.
76 Id. at 30.
17 Id. at 36-46.
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purchase channels on an A la carte basis or as part of a bundle.78
Another option is "themed tiers," which would allow consumers to
purchase tiers of related programming, such as children's or sports
tiers. 79 A third option is "subscriber-selected tiers," which would
allow customers to have the choice of purchasing smaller packages of
channels than are currently offered for a reduced price, with the
customer choosing the channels that go into the bundle.
80
Given the Booz Allen Study's indirect approach and reliance
on assumptions, "neither the Booz Allen study nor the two FCC
reports.. .should be viewed as providing definitive results."
8 1
Although the Further Report criticizes the First Report, there is also
plenty of criticism of the Further Report, and its conclusions that
"cannot be proven one way or the other.",82 There is no doubt a
switch to A la carte could have serious implications-negative and
positive-for consumers. The question is how regulators and
lawmakers should address the issue.
VIII. The Antitrust Argument Against Channel
Bundling
One way to address the A la carte issue under existing laws is
to attack the current bundling arrangement under antitrust laws. On
September 20, 2007, cable and satellite customers filed a class action
antitrust suit in U.S. District Court seeking to end the cable and
satellite providers' practice of bundling channels. 83  The suit,
Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.-which has the endorsement of FCC
Chairman, Kevin Martin 84 -alleges the practice, which forces
customers to purchase a bundle of channels if they want to receive
78 Id. at 37-39.
71 Id. at 39-41.
80 FURTHER REPORT, supra note 11, at 42-44.
81 The FCC's "a la Carte" Reports, supra note 44, at 2-3.
82 Id. at 3.
83 Press Release, Yahoo Finance, Blecher & Collins, P.C. Announces
Consumers File Antitrust Class Action Challenging Media Industry Refusal to
Offer "A La Carte" Programming to Cable and Satellite Subscribers (Sep. 20,
2007), http://biz.yahoo.com/iw/070920/0305229.html [hereinafter Blecher &
Collins]; Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-06101 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
84 Ted Hearn, Martin Backs Cable Antitrust Suit, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sep.
25, 2007, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6482791.html.
2008] 425
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any one channel in the bundle, precludes customer choice, in
violation of federal antitrust law. 85 Specifically, the suit alleges that
the programmers' practice of tying channels, with knowledge that
other programmers operate in the same manner, effectively requires
that cable and satellite companies buy channels despite low consumer
demand. 86 Cable and satellite companies then offer the channels to
subscribers in large bundles, driving up the price and depriving the
consumers of choice. 87 Therefore, the suit asserts that programmers'
tying practices are in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 88
The suit seeks damages, "and an injunction to eliminate the 'tying'
arrangements in the industry and allow consumers to purchase
channels on an 'a la carte' basis."89
On its face, video programmers' current tying practices, and
the resulting large tier system of cable and satellite distribution to
customers, look a lot like the situation at issue in U.S. v. Loew 's.90 In
Loew's, the Supreme Court addressed film distributors' practice of
bundling together the licensing of feature films in an effort to
pressure television stations to purchase the rights to inferior films (the
"tied" product) in order to obtain the rights to desirable films (the
"tying" product). 91 To get films such as The Treasure of the Sierra
Madre and Casablanca, a local television station had to buy others,
such as Gorilla Man and Tear Gas Squad.92  Agreeing with the
district court's finding-"conditioning the sale of one or more
copyrighted feature films to television stations upon the purchase of
one or more other films is illegal"-the Court held that the block
85 Blecher & Collins, supra note 83; Brantley, supra note 83.
86 Blecher & Collins, supra note 83.
87 id.
88 Brantley, supra note 83; Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2008) ("Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal.").
89 Blecher & Collins, supra note 83.
90 See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), abrogated by Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
91 Loew's, 371 U.S. at 40. "The Product the buyer wants to buy is called the
'tying' product. The product the purchaser is forced to buy in order to acquire the
tying product is the 'tied' product." STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST
LAW 273 (1993) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW].
92 Loew's, 371 U.S. at 41-42.
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booking practice was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 93
The decision was based on a presumption that the required level of
economic power was present "when the tying product is patented or
copyrighted. 94 To determine whether cable programmers are also
violating antitrust law, it is useful to briefly examine the general
framework of antitrust law and the changes in the Court's approach
to tying cases since 1962, when Loew's was decided.
The purpose of federal antitrust law is to preserve competition
in the market place and promote consumer welfare. In 1890,
Congress enacted the Sherman Act pursuant to its authority to
regulate interstate commerce. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
collective action that unreasonably restrains trade. Specifically,
liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires: "(1) the
existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two or
more separate entities that (2) unreasonably restrains trade and (3)
affects interstate or foreign commerce."
95
A. The Existence of a Combination
In the absence of an express contract, combination, or
conspiracy, establishing the first requirement requires an inference of
agreement. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, several movie
distributors raised rates and limited distribution after an exhibitor
requested the restraints in a letter, which made it clear that each of the
other distributors was receiving the same letter. 96 The Court held
that a jprice fixing agreement could be inferred from this parallel
action. 9  In subsequent cases, however, the Court has established
that an allegation of conscious parallel behavior alone is not enough
to prove the existence of a conspiracy when the defendants present
evidence that they each made their decision independently, based on
their own business judgment. 98 Because cable programmers would
9' Id. at 52.
94 Id. at 45-46 (citing Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)).
95 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, I ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2
(6th ed. 2007) (citing cases) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
96 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 216-20 (1939).
97 Id. at 226-27.
98 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-66; Theatre
Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1954).
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also likely present evidence that they individually reached the
conclusion that tying was in their own best interest, proving
agreement would require a showing of additional facts and
circumstances that "support an inference of concerted action."
99
B. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade
The second requirement, proving that the agreement
"unreasonably restrains trade," may prove even more difficult to
establish. An agreement constitutes an unreasonable restraint if it
"raises price, reduces output, diminishes quality, limits choice, or
creates, maintains, enhances, or preserves market power."' 00 Tying
arrangements may potentially have each of these effects on trade, and
also deny consumers the freedom of choice. 101
Tying arrangements occur when the sale of a tying product is
conditioned on the purchase of a tied product.' 02 The law governing
such arrangements has developed to address both economic and non-
economic concerns. Many of the decisions that helped shape the
Court's modern approach to tying were based largely on the non-
economic concerns. For example, the holding in International Salt v.
United States'0 3 is based on the Court's belief "that one company
should not be disadvantaged because it did not also happen to be
selling a desirable second product."10 4 Similarly, in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States,10 5 "the Court expressly objected to the
denial of freedom of choice for consumers." 
106
The Court's analytical approach to tying arrangements has
evolved over the years. In early cases the Supreme Court expressed
the view that such arrangements were, in their very nature,
unreasonable restraints-saying tying arrangements "serve hardly
99 See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 95, at 11 (citing cases).
100 Id. at 47 (citing cases).
10' See PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 91, at 277-84.
102 Id. at 273.
103 Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool
Works, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
104 See PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 91, at 278.
105 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
106 See PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 91, at 279.
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any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."' 0 7  More
recently, in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, which
involved a tying arrangement for anesthesiological and surgical
services, the Supreme Court said a tying arrangement is per se invalid
if the seller exploits "its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on
different terms." 108 If a plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that a tying
arrangement is a per se violation under this standard, the arrangement
may still be unlawful under the rule of reason.
C. Per Se Violations
Under the per se analysis applied in Jefferson Parrish,
condemnation may be appropriate, with no actual showing of
anticompetitive effects required, if the plaintiff demonstrates the
presence of several elements. 10 9 First, for a tying arrangement to
occur, two separate products or services must be involved." 0  In
Jefferson Parish, the Court rejected the hospital's argument that
anesthesiology and surgical services should be considered one
product because they were "a functionally integrated package of
services."1 1  The Court noted that a prohibited tying arrangement
may be present even when a functionally linked product would be
useless without the other." 2  Under the reasoning of Jefferson
Parish, even if the delivery of cable to consumers is arguably a single
service, a court may reasonably find that the sale of programming to
MPVDs involves the sale of separate products. The second element,
the refusal to sell the product or service separately,"1 3 is present in
both the wholesale and retail cable markets. The presence of the
third element, market power sufficient to give the seller the ability to
107 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-306 (1949).
108 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984),
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28).
109 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16.
'10 Id. at 21-22.
... Id. at 18-19.
112 Id. at 21 n.30 (citing cases).
113 Id at 11.
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force the buyer to buy the tied product, 14 will likely be vigorously
contested by programmers.
In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court said that sufficient
market power for per se liability may be present "when the seller's
share of the market is high, or when the seller offers a unique product
that competitors are not able to offer." 115  The Court found that
because "[s]eventy percent of the patients residing in Jefferson Parish
enter hospitals other than East Jefferson," the hospital did not have
"the kind of market power that justifies [per se] condemnation of
tying." 16 Since Jefferson Parish was decided, "no court has inferred
the requisite market power from a market share below 30 percent."
1 17
As applied to cable programming, if the market for cable
programming is national or international, any individual
programmer's market share would likely be insufficient. For
example, even Viacom, one of the largest programmers, argues that
no individual broadcast network has market power sufficient to
coerce acceptance of a tied product. 1 8 If, however, a plaintiff can
successfully prove that the programmers are working together, the
collective market share controlled by defendants may be high enough
to demonstrate market power sufficient to give the sellers the ability
to force the buyers to the tied products.
The importance of the market power element was recently
made clear in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., where the
Court held that proof of the defendant's market power in the tyin
product is required "in all cases involving a tying arrangement.""
In Illinois Tool, the Court noted that Congress' amendments to the
Patent Code since Jefferson Parish have made clear that a finding of
market power cannot be presumed because of the mere existence of a
patent. 120
Even if no sufficient showing of market share is made, the
plaintiff may still demonstrate market power by proving the seller's
114 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14.
115 Id. at 17.
116 Id. at 26-27.
17 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 95, at 192 (citing cases).
118 FIRST REPORT, supra note 46, at 72 (citing Viacom Reply Comments, at 13).
119 Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 46.
120 See id. at 41-43.
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product is unique. 12  Exactly what constitutes sufficient proof of
"uniqueness," however, has not been established by the Supreme
Court and the lower courts are still divided. 1
22
However, courts have been increasingly hesitant to find a per
se violation in tying cases. For example, the Court of Appeals
refused to apply the per se rule against tying to the facts in U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp. 23 -which may have been a signal of "judicial
skepticism about the per se tying rule."' 124  Also, Illinois Tool
strongly suggests that tying is no longer a per se violation of antitrust
law, and such arrangements should be analyzed under the rule of
reason. 125
D. Rule of Reason
Although it is questionable whether the cable industry's tying
practices would meet all of the requirements of a per se violation, the
arrangement may still be unlawful under the rule of reason. The rule
of reason analysis requires an examination of the actual effect of the
tying arrangement on the market of the tied product.' 
26
Theoretically, a tying arrangement may be prohibited under the rule
of reason even if the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant has
sufficient market power. 127 Most courts, however, require a showing
of market power in the tying product market. 128 And a strict reading
of the court's holding in Illinois Tool, that "in all cases involving a
tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
market power in the tying product," 29 indicates that market power is
a necessary element, even under the rule of reason. The threshold for
121 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17.
122 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 95, at 196-98.
123 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (C.A.D.C., 2001).
124 A. Douglas Melamed & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. v. Microsoft: Lessons
Learned and Issues Raised, in ANTITRUST STORIES 287, 309 (Eleanor M. Fox &
Daniel A. Crane ed., 2007).
125 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Tying: Antitrust Law and Policy, Mar. 2007,
http://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/jacobson0307.pdf.
126 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29.
127 See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959
F.2d 468, 482-85 (3d Cir. 1992).
128 See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 95, at 205 (citing cases).
129 Illinois Tool, 547 U.S. at 46.
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market power, however, may not be as high under the rule of reason
analysis, and the Court may be willing to consider the cumulative
effect of the widespread use of similar practices by other companies
in the same market. 1
30
If plaintiffs are able to demonstrate sufficient market power
for rule of reason analysis, they will still have a substantial burden to
overcome. Plaintiffs would then need to show that the tying practice
caused actual adverse effects on market competition. 131 In Microsoft,
to show that a practice was a tying violation, the court directed
plaintiffs to demonstrate "that Microsoft's conduct was, on balance,
anticompetitive."' 132  And if Microsoft offered procompetitive
justifications, it would be the "plaintiffs' burden to show that the
anticompetitive effect of the conduct outweighs its benefit."' 133 As
discussed above, the effects of the cable industry's bundling practices
are disputed. Cable programmers contend that bundling has
benefits-keeping prices low, and diversity high. It will be the
plaintiffs' burden to show either that these are not actual benefits of
bundling or that they are "outweighed by the harms in the tied
product market." 1
34
E. Affects Commerce
The last requirement, proving that the restraint "affects
interstate or foreign commerce," will be much easier to establish. In
the case of cable programming, the impact on interstate commerce is
evident because of the inherently commercial and interstate nature of
the wholesale of video programming.
F. Antitrust Conclusions
Because Illinois Tool effectively overruled the holding in
Loew's-that market power could be presumed-the surface
resemblance of cable bundling to the facts in Loew's does not
130 See FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953)
(in determining the effect of a theatre advertiser's exclusive dealing contracts the
Supreme Court considered the effect of the use of similar practices by three other
firms in the same industry).
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 95, at 204-05.
132 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 95.
133 Id.
14 See id at 96 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29).
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necessarily mean that cable programmers are in violation of antitrust
law. 135  Although proving the required market power would be
difficult, plaintiffs in an antitrust suit against cable programmers,
such as the Brantley case, may be able to demonstrate the elements of
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. A court, however, may be
hesitant to apply per se analysis to a tying arrangement. If the rule of
reason analysis is applied instead, the plaintiffs will have an
extremely difficult time proving that the harms of cable bundling
outweigh the benefits with the data that is currently available.
IX. The First Amendment Argument Against A La
Carte
Regardless of the particular outcome in the Brantley case
currently pending in federal court, or any other case against cable
programmers, the i la carte debate will likely continue. Even if the
current large bundle system does not violate antitrust laws, there is
nothing to prevent Congress from passing legislation which changes
the way video programming is sold. Or is there? Some have argued
that a law which forces programmers or MVPDs to offer channels on
an d la carte or themed-tier basis would violate the First Amendment
rights of cable operators.
Cable operators and program networks contend that the
decision of which channels to bundle together is an exercise of
"editorial discretion," and is thus protected by the First
Amendment. 136 In a report commissioned by NCTA, Geoffrey R.
Stone and David A. Strauss present the argument that "both the i la
carte and themed-tier requirements would violate the First
Amendment."1 37 They argue that the proposed A la carte requirement
does not survive the applicable "intermediate" level of scrutiny.'
38
They further contend that the proposed themed-tier requirement is
1' See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 95, at 191 n. 1098.
136 See FIRST REPORT, supra note 46, at 33-36.
137 Geoffrey R. Stone & David A. Strauss, The First Amendment Implications
of Government-Imposed A La Carte and Themed-Tier Requirements on Cable
Operators and Program Networks 3 (Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n Expert Study,
Jul. 1, 2004), http://www.ncta.com/PublicationType/RegulatoryFiling/2883.aspx?
hidenavlink =true&type=lpubtp5 [hereinafter Stone & Strauss].
138 Id. at 3-4.
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even more problematic, as it is a content-based restriction and would
thus be subject to strict scrutiny. 139
Cable industry representatives argue that regulation that
would require themed tiers would amount to a content-based
restriction of cable television. 14 Assuming "the government would
play a role in specifying the criteria that determine the definition of
such tiers," Stone and Strauss agree that a themed-tier requirement
would indeed be "content-based."' 4' Such content-based speech
restrictions-"enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the
basis of its content" 42 -are evaluated using "strict scrutiny."'
143
Under strict scrutiny analysis the government has the burden
of proving that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest.14 4  If the governmental interest is to allow
consumers to avoid paying for channels they do not want, a less
restrictive regulation-one that does not discriminate based on
content, such as A la carte-would likely achieve that goal. If the
governmental interest is to "enable some subscribers to avoid
channels containing content they find distasteful,"' 145 the restriction
would likely violate the First Amendment because when "the
designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the
sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression
prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists. ' 146 Rather
than rely on government restrictions, cable subscribers would be
"expected to protect [their] own sensibilities 'simply by averting
[their] eyes. ,, 47
If, however, the government played no role in determining the
content of the themed tiers, the regulation would likely be content-
139 Id. at 16-17.
140 FIRST REPORT, supra note 46, at 35.
141 Stone & Strauss, supra note 137, at 16.
142 City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
143 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(citing Sable Commc'n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
144 See Sable Commc 'ns, 492 U.S. at 126.
145 Stone & Strauss, supra note 137, at 16.
146 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
147 Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-211 (1975)).
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neutral, and thus not subject to strict scrutiny. 48 Accordingly, such
non-government defined tiers would be evaluated using the same
analysis as would likely apply to the At la carte requirement.
Applying that analysis, Stone and Strauss contend that cable
operators' "decisions about which programs to make available, and
how best to package them," 149 are analogous to "[t]he choice of
material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment."' 150 Case law supports
this analogy. In First Amendment cases involving cable, the
Supreme Court has "noted that cable operators exercise 'a significant
amount of editorial discretion regarding what their programming will
include.""'5
1
In determining whether the regulation of the editorial process
required by A la carte regulation would violate the First Amendment,
Stone and Strauss draw comparisons to the must-carry provisions
previously upheld by a plurality in the Turner decisions. 152 In Turner
I, the Court held that must-carry provisions were content-neutral
restrictions and thus should be evaluated using the intermediate level
of scrutiny.' 53 But the Court remanded the case for a determination
of "the extent to which the must-carry provisions in fact interfere
with protected speech," so that the Court could determine "whether
they suppress 'substantially more speech than... necessary' to
ensure the viability of broadcast television."'1 54 In Turner II, four
Justices reaffirmed the important government interests served by the
must-carry provisions: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-
air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread
148 Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47.
149 Stone & Strauss, supra note 137, at 2 (citing Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
150 Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258.
1' City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'n, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979)).
152 Stone & Strauss, supra note 137, at 4-16; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I]; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner 1].
153 Turner!, 512 U.S. at 661-62.
154 Id. at 668 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799
(1989)).
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dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3)
promoting fair competition in the market for television
programming."'' 5 5 Although Stone and Strauss address the first two
interests-concluding that an A la carte requirement would not further
either purpose-they do not address the third because it was the basis
for the decision of only four Justices. 
5 6
With regard to the third interest, the principal opinion in
Turner II states that "it is undisputed [that] the Government has an
interest in 'eliminating restraints on fair competition. . ., even when
the individuals or entities subject to particular regulations are
engaged in expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment."' 15 7 In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Breyer
states that his conclusion does not rest "upon the principal opinion's
analysis of the statute's efforts to 'promot[e] fair competition."", 158
The opinions of Justice Breyer along with Justice O'Connor, joined
in dissent by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, do agree that
"promoting fair competition is a legitimate and substantial
Governmental goal."' 1 9  These five Justices, however, did not find
that the must-carry provisions at issue were narrowly tailored to
address anticompetitive behavior. 1
60
In light of changes in the Court since the Turner decision, and
the lack of a majority decision that must-carry provisions were
justified by the government's interest in competition, the outcome of
a First Amendment case involving an d la carte regulation is far from
clear. The question would likely be whether Congress could
reasonably conclude that the practice of bundling networks poses a
real threat to market competition. The outcome would depend on the
evidence before Congress. As discussed above, the debate is
currently ongoing and the reports are inconclusive as to what impact
155 Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, at 189 (stating that "must-carry was designed to
serve 'three interrelated interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air
local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in
the market for television programming."' Id. (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662).
"We decided then, and now reaffirm, that each of those is an important
governmental interest." Id.).
156 Stone & Strauss, supra note 137, at 5-6.
157 Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 190 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664).
158 Id. at 225-26 (Breyer, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 232 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 229 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 233 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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A la carte, or some alternative system, would have on competition in
the wholesale and retail cable markets.
X. Conclusion
The desire to change to an A la carte system for video
programming will likely continue so long as subscribers feel they are
paying too much and receiving too many channels they do not watch.
Neither side in the ongoing debate will be content with the opposite
extreme-pure bundling or pure A la carte. Although there are
alternatives to the two extremes, nothing has emerged as a viable
compromise. Regulators and lawmakers will have difficulty
establishing a workable compromise without definitive data on the
potential impact of a change in the cable and satellite distribution
system on price, diversity and choice. Without more conclusive
findings, it is unlikely the antitrust laws will invalidate the current
large bundle system. And if lawmakers do decide to mandate a
change, the potential First Amendment implications are unclear.
Nevertheless, evolving technology may eventually produce a
change. New alternatives to cable and satellite may lead to an
increase in competition and a resulting increase in choice and
decrease in prices. Additionally, the internet is currently offering an
alternative to networks unable to find a place in the current large tier
system.161 If lawmakers do decide to implement a mandated A la
carte system, and it survives the inevitable Constitutional challenges,
niche networks that do not survive the competition for subscribers
and advertising may find a home on the internet.
161 See Bobby White, TV Channels Move to Web, Think Outside the Cable
Box, WALL ST. J., Eastern Ed., Aug. 10, 2007, at B 1.
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